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Cumulative Prospect Theory (PT) introduced the weighting of probabilities as an
additional component to capture risk attitudes. However, this addition would be a less
signicant challenge to expected utility theory (EU) if utility curvature and probability
weighting showed strong positive correlation. In that case the utility curvature in EU
alone, while not properly describing risky behavior in general, would still capture most
of the variance of individual risk aversion. This study provides experimental evidence
that such a strong and positive correlation does not exist. Although most individuals
exhibit concave utility and convex probability weighting, the two components show
no strong positive correlation.
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In expected utility theory (hereafter EU), the attitude towards risk originates from changes
in marginal utility (i.e., the curvature of the utility function). As a result, risk attitudes are
traditionally caputred by tting the best EU model and then using the individual utility
curvature as the sole index of risk attitude. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrated
various empirical deciencies of that view. In (cumulative) prospect theory (hereafter
PT) they added a second component to assess risk attitudes, namely the weighting of
probabilities. Wakker (1994) gave an intuitive interpretation on the distinct roles that
these two components play in the assessment of risk attitudes: Utility describes an intrinsic
appreciation of money prior to probability or risk, while risk attitude originates from the
perception of probabilities.
Studies testing PT or measuring these two components of risk attitudes are abundant (see,
e.g. Harrison and Rutstrom, 2008, for a review). Yet to the best of our knowledge, no
study has so far addressed the relation between these two components. Previous literature
has either been silent on this relation or implicitly assumed independence. Addressing
this question is, however, important, since PT would pose a less signicant challenge to
EU if the two components, utility curvature and probability weighting, were signicantly
and positively correlated (more concave in utility corresponds to more underweighting in
probability). In that case, one could argue that the utility curvature in EU { while not
properly describing risk behavior in general { would still capture most of the variance
regarding degrees of risk aversion, making the other component of risk redundant.
In this study we investigate the relation between these two components of risk. Are
they truly unconnected? Can an individual be risk seeking in one component and risk
averse in the other? Results from our controlled laboratory experiment suggest that this
may well be the case. While most individuals in our study exhibit concave utility and
convex probability weighting, we nd no signicant positive correlation between the two
components. In a broader context, our results provide further evidence that measuring risk
attitude through the curvature of utility alone may not be sucient to describe decision
making under risk, and that neglecting either of the two components entails a loss.
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measurement of the two components is essential. In this study we employ the trade-o
method (hereafter TO) (Wakker and Denee, 1996) to measure risk attitude, which is
the only method to date that allows for an independent measurement of the two compo-
nents. Among others, Abdellaoui (2000), Abdellaoui et al. (2005), and van de Kuilen and
Wakker (2009) have employed the TO method. In this paper we mostly rely on the TO
as introduced by Abdellaoui (2000). The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
2 outlines the procedure and experimental setup; technical details are in the Appendix.
Section 3 contains the main results. The paper closes with a discussion and a conclusion
in Sections 4 and 5.
2 The TO Method and Experimental Setup
We restrict ourselves to PT for gains and binary lotteries with objective probabilities. Let
(xi+1;p;xi) denote a prospect yielding xi+1 with probability p and xi otherwise. When
xi < xi+1 this prospect is evaluated by w(p)u(xi+1) + [1   w(p)]u(xi) in PT, where the
utility function u() is assumed to be strictly increasing over the outcome space [0;1),
and the probability weighting function w() is increasing over the probability space [0;1],
with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1.
The TO method elicits utility and probability weights in two consecutive steps. In the
rst step (UT), a standard sequence of outcomes x1;:::;xn, i.e., equally spaced outcomes
in terms of utility, is constructed. The second step (PW) uses this standard sequence
to measure probability weights. More specically, in UT an xi+1 is determined to make
the subject indierent between A : (xi+1;p;r) and B : (xi;p;R), where p, r, and R are
exogenous parameters, and xi > R > r. With xi+1 at hand, xi+2 is then varied in a similar
way to make the subject indierent between A : (xi+2;p;r) and B : (xi+1;p;R). According
to PT, the two indierence relations imply:
[1   w(p)]u(R) + w(p)u(xi) = [1   w(p)]u(r) + w(p)u(xi+1);
[1   w(p)]u(R) + w(p)u(xi+1) = [1   w(p)]u(r) + w(p)u(xi+2);
) u(xi+2)   u(xi+1) = u(xi+1)   u(xi): (1)
2
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(xi;xi+1;xi+2) are equally spaced on the utility axis. Starting with a certain x0 and
constructing recursively n times, we obtain a standard sequence of x0;x1;:::;xn.
In PW, the obtained standard sequence of outcomes x0;x1;:::;xn is used to determine
a sequence of probabilities. For each xi;i = 1; ;n   1, a pi is determined to make
the subject indierent between a lottery A : (xn;pi;x0) and a certain outcome B : (xi).
According to PT the indierence implies:
w(pi)u(xn) + [1   w(pi)]u(x0) = w(1)u(xi) ) w(pi) =
u(xi)   u(x0)
u(xn)   u(x0)
; 8i = 1;:::;n   1: (2)
By (1), we know that u(xi+1) u(xi) is constant, and the above equation can be simplied
in w(pi) = i=n; for i = 1;:::;n   1: The elicited values of p1;p2;:::;pn 1, along with the
fact that w(pi) = i=n, allow us to estimate the shape w(p).
The experiment was conducted in June 2008 with 124 Jena university undergraduate
students.1 We xed the parameters at: p = 0:5, r = 0, R = 10, and x0 = 20. We elicited 6
points for utility and 5 points for probabilities. Indierence was obtained by the modied
bisection method, using 8 iterations for each xi, and 7 iterations to obtain each pi.2 A
consistency check for each xi was carried out by repeating the 7th choice. For probabilities
we checked for consistency by eliciting a p0
3 such that (x3)  (x4;p0
3;x2), which should
equal to p3 according to PT. This resulted in 54 rounds for the UT part and 42 rounds for
the PW part. One round of each part was individually selected at random, the preferred
lottery was played, and the resulting amounts was paid privately and individually to the
participant. The average earning was 16 €, with a min of 8 and max of 46 €.3
1We ran 4 sessions, with 32 subjects in 3 sessions and 28 subjects in one session. Each session lasted
about 90 minutes. The experiment included two further parts. Those results are reported in Qiu and
Steiger (2009).
2A detailed description of the TO and the modied bisection method can be found in Appendix 1. The
procedure to elicit pi was made variable (7 or 9 iterations) to accommodate inconsistent choices. However,
this turned out to be unnecessary.
3We used ztree (Fischbacher, 2007) for experimental software and ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) to manage
invitations to participants. An English translation of the original instructions is attached in the Appendix
2.
3
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3.1 Consistency and Reliability
We repeated the 7th choice pair of each xi to check for consistency. Preference reversal
occurred in 30% of the cases. This seemingly large number may originate from the small
remaining interval for the inference of xi at the 7th choice4 and is comparable to the
ndings in Starmer and Sugden (1989) (26.5%) and Camerer (1989) (31.6%). In PW, we
checked for consistency by comparing (x6;p3;x0) s (x3) and (x4;p0
3;x2) s (x3). According
to PT, the two probabilities should be equal (p3 = p0
3). Indeed, the median values of p3
and p0
3 are equal to 0:5, and they are not signicantly dierent (paired Wilcoxon signed
rank test p > 0:10.).5
3.2 Classication of utility functions
To classify each utility function, we calculated a ratio (denoted by u) of the area above
the (linearly normalized) utility function and the rectangular area between (x0, 0) and
(x6, 1).6 This ratio classied the concavity, convexity or linearity of the utility function
in a non-parametric way. For each subject, money was measured on the x-axis (from x0
to x6) and utility was measured on the y-axis (from 0 to 1, at an increment of 1=6). We
calculated the area above these points (with linear approximation) and then normalized
this measure by dividing the area by 1  (x6   x0). This gave a measure of u between 0
and 1, with risk aversion decreasing with the increase in u. We classied 26 subjects with
a u between 0:47  u  0:53 as having linear utility functions. With this measure, 71
subjects had concave (u < 0:47) and 27 subjects had convex (u > 0:53) utility functions.
4Note that for x1, when the interval is rather small (the dierence was less than 2), preference reversal
occurs in 39% of the cases, while it lowers to 23% for x6. This suggests that preference reversal is to some
extent the result of small choice intervals. For larger intervals reversal is reduced yet still remains.
5The mean dierence p3  p
0
3 =  0:015, and the mean and median absolute dierence are 0.16 and 0.11
respectively. The means are p3 = :6615 and p
0
3 = :6766.
6Note that we calculated the area above, not below, the curve, i.e. the area between u = 1 and the
utility curve. This gives u the same property as  of u(x) = x
: an increase in u and  both implies less
risk aversion.
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u Dierence Both
concave 71 67 59
convex 27 9 6
linear 26 25 12
Table 1: Classication of utility, rst according to the area ratio, then to the non-parametric
method, and nally to both criteria
As a control, we also employed a non-parametric dierence method to check for robustness
of the above classication. Similar to Abdellaoui (2000), we took the rst order dierence
0




j = 1;:::;5. We classied 67 subjects as concave (with 00
j > 2 for 3 or more out of 5
times), 9 subjects as convex (with 00
j <  2 for 3 or more out of 5 times), and 25 subjects
as linear (with  2  00
j  2 for 3 or more out of 5 times). The remaining 23 subjects
could not be classied with this method. As shown in Table 1, the majority of subjects
was consistent with both classication methods, in particular those with concave utility
functions. As a robustness check we also assumed a power form utility function u(x) = x
and estimated an  for each individual with his/her sequence of values x1;x2;:::;x6 using
an OLS regression log(u(x)) = Intercept + log(x) + , where   N(0;2). We found
that the mean  equals 0:9316 and the median equals 0:8744 (Std error equals 0:0299),
and that 74 s are signicantly dierent from 1 (at 5% signicant level), with 58 s are
signicantly smaller than 1 and 18 s are signicantly larger than 1. The two measures
(u and ) are highly and positively correlated (Spearman's  = 0:6877, p < 0:01), which
supports the use of u as a measure of utility curvature.
3.3 Classication of probability weighting functions
A classication of probability weighting requires careful consideration. Previous experi-
ments found mostly inverse S, but also S, linear, convex, and concave shaped probability
weighting functions. First, we checked each subject's array of pi for patterns. The pattern
of probability weighting is best discovered when p is close to 0 or 1, where probability
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w( (p) ) = =
0.34p
1.36
0.34p1.36+ +( (1- -p) )1.36
w( (p) ) = = p
Figure 1: Boxplot of the probability weighting. The curve w(p) =
0:46p
1:08
0:46p1:08+(1 p)1:08 is tted with
median data.
weighting is supposed to be most pronounced. Thus a simple way to detect patterns is
to compare w1 with p1 and w5 with p5. We classied a probability weighting as convex
(or optimistic) when w1 < p1 and w5 < p5, as concave (or pessimistic) when w1 > p1 and
w5 > p5, as inverse S-shaped when w1 > p1 and w5 < p5, and as S-shaped when w1 < p1
and w5 > p5. Based on these criteria, 83 subjects were convex, 4 subjects concave, 19
subjects inverse S-shaped, and 18 subjects S-shaped. Figure 1 gives a boxplot of the
probability weights. The data pattern clearly favors a convex probability weighting.
Knowing the general pattern of probability weights, we took the area below the (linearly
normalized) probability weights as a measure of pessimism. We used probabilities as
x-axis (from p1 to p5) and decision weights as y-axis (from 0 to 1, at an increment of
1=6). We calculated the area below these points (with linear approximation) to obtain a
ratio (denoted by p) between 0 and 1. The magnitude of p states whether a subject,
in general, overweights or underweights probabilities. In order to highlight the dierent
components of risk attitudes, we classify subjects as pessimistic, neutral, and optimistic
if their u < 0:47, 0:47  u  0:53, and u > 0:53, respectively. With this measure,
6
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p Non-parametric Both
convex / optimism 97 convex 83 77
concave / pessimism 5 concave 4 2
linear 22 S 18 {
Inverse S 19 {
Table 2: Classication of probability weighting, rst according to the area ratio, then according
to the non-parametric method, and nally according to both criteria
97 subjects were pessimistic, 23 subjects were optimistic, and 33 subjects were neutral in
probability weighting. Results and a comparison to the non-parametric method are shown
in Table 2. Variations in the tolerance level did not alter results dramatically.
Since p is merely an index of optimism or pessimism. It does not capture the degree
of inverse S or S. For robustness check, we also assumed a parametric form for the
probability weighting function: w(p) =
p
p+(1 p). This form was introduced by Goldstein
and Einhorn (1987) and has been frequently used. It allows for most common shapes of
probability weighting, depending on the combination of  and , with  being an index of
pessimism and optimism. With ve data points pi;i = 1;2;3;4;5, we estimated a  and a
 for each subject by minimizing the sums of squared residuals7. The median of  equals
0:495 (mean  = 0:5679, Std. error equals 0.0316) and  equals 0:88 (mean  = 1:0468,
Std. error equals 0.0627). As we can see from Figure 1, the tted curve using median
data clearly favors a convex probability weighting function. The high correlation between
p and  (two{sided Spearman's  = 0:8746, p < 0:01) also suggests that p captures
probability weighting reasonably well.
7We used a wide range of values,  from 0 to 2 at an increment of 0.01,  from 0 to 4 at an increment
of 0.04.
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Our main question, to which we now turn, is the relation between utility curvature and
probability weights. The results are reported in Table 3 and Figure 2. The largest group
in Table 3 are the subjects with concave utility functions and pessimism in the probability
weighting (55 subjects). This nding is convenient for economists, since most theoretical
models rely on the assumption of risk averse agents. Our result suggests that the majority
of the population may indeed be risk averse in both components (concave in utility and
convex in probability weighting). There are further interesting patterns in the data. The
third cell in the rst row denotes the subjects with convex utility but pessimistic prob-
ability weighting. They are the second largest group in our classication (26 subjects).
This is mirrored by the 4 subjects in the rst cell of the third row. This cell denotes the
subjects with concave utility but optimistic probability weighting.
In light of information obtained on the curvature of utility and probability weighting, a
natural question is: Are subjects who are more concave in utility also more convex in
probability weighting? To test this hypothesis, we ran a one{sided Spearman's  rank cor-
relation test of u and p for all subjects. It turned out that the correlation had the wrong
sign, and was not signicant (Spearman's  =  0:1597, p = 0:9617)! The subjects with
concave utility and convex probability weighting are those most often assumed in economic
theories. As shown above, this is the largest group in our data and most robust to dier-
ent classication methods. However, for those subjects the correlation is not signicant
either (one{sided Spearman's rank correlation,  = 0:0701, p = 0:6108). Correlating the
parametric estimator  with  gives qualitatively the same result (one{sided Spearman's
 rank correlation test between  and ,  = 0:0761 and p = 0:2004 for all subjects, and
 =  0:0656 and p = 0:317 for subjects who are risk averse in both components).
A more general illustration of our main result is shown in Figure 2. Here the relation
between u and p is plotted for each subject. The x-axis depicts u and the y-axis depicts
p. Small p values correspond to pessimism in probability weighting, and small u values
correspond to concave utility. The lower left square represents the largest group of subjects
with pessimistic/convex risk attitude. As we can see, no positive correlation between u
and p is apparent.
8
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u Convex u Sum
Pessimistic p 55 16 26 97
Neutral p 12 10 0 22
Optimistic p 4 0 1 5
Sum 71 26 27 124
Table 3: The two components of risk attitudes. The collums depict the utility and the rows the
probability weighting
4 Discussion
The TO method requires questions to be chained. It is known that this can give subjects
incentives to not answer truthfully Harrison (1986). In theory, subjects could increase their
expected payo by pretending to be more risk averse. Yet, this does not seem to be a
practical problem. Van de Kuilen and Wakker (2009), who also employed the TO method,
found subjects in post-experimental interviews to be unaware of the chained structure, let
alone the manipulation possibilities. In our data, we checked for possible manipulation
by comparing the reported xi with the possible upper range of xi. By our experimental
design this ratio equals 0:67 for a risk neutral agent.8 If, however, subjects reported their
x0
i strategically, this ratio would be close to 1. Our data shows that the mean of the ratios
is 0:80, which is consistent with a reasonable degree of risk aversion.
One may nd it surprising that in our study we have mostly convex probability weighting
functions while in most previous literature inverse S was prevalent { the more so because
we used the same method as Abdellaoui (2000), who found inverse S to be prevailing. We
have no conclusive explanation for this dierence. But we suspect that it might be related
to experimental procedure, subject pool, stake size, and payment method.9 Abdellaoui
used small group interviews with subjects who were acquainted with probabilities and
expectations, whereas we used group sessions with subjects of diversied backgrounds. He
8For more detailed information, refer to Appendix 1.
9Unfortunately we could not use the data of Abdellaoui (2000) for comparison, as this data has been
lost.
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Figure 2: Distribution of the area ratios in utility and probability weighting. The largest group in
the lower left corner represents the subjects who are averse in utility and pessimistic in probability
weighting.
also used a much larger stake size (outcomes between U.S. $200 and U.S. $4,000) but paid
only 1 out of 46 subjects on the basis of their decisions, while we used outcomes between
1 and 5 euro, and paid all subjects on the basis of their decisions. Another explanation
is that the inverse S could not be detected, because the rst weight elicited was 1/6. Our
results are not unique though. van de Kuilen (2009) and van de Kuilen and Wakker (2009)
found similar results. Thus the shape of probability weighting is perhaps not as clear as
we thought, and more research needs to be done.
For a robust check of our central hypothesis, we also analyzed Bleichrodt and Pinto's 2000
data. Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) mainly found inverse S-shaped probability weighting.
We calculated u and p for their data. The one{sided Spearman's  rank correlation
test between u and p gives qualitatively the same result:  =  0:4328 (p = 0:999).
We assumed a power form u(x) = x for utility functions and w(p) =
p
p+(1 p) for
probability weighting functions, and estimated the , , and  by minimizing the sum
10
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 gives qualitatively the same result:  =  0:4469 (p = 0:9993). These results suggest
that our result is neither limited to our data nor to the shape of the probability weighting
function.
5 Conclusion
In view of numerous studies exploring risk attitudes, it is now probably less controversial
to argue that risk attitudes have two components. Yet to the best of our knowledge,
no study has so far addressed the relation between these two components of risk. This
question is important because PT would have been a less signicant challenge to EU if
the curvature of utility and probability weighting had been strongly correlated.
In this paper, we elicited risk attitudes using the trade-o method. We classied utility
and probability weighting for each individual subject and analyzed the relation between
the two components. We found that, although most individuals exhibit concave utility
and convex probability weighting, the two components show no positive correlation. This
suggests that the curvature of utility alone is an insucient proxy for risk attitudes, and
that an accurate account of risk attitudes requires the measurement of both.
11
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ed) bisection choice procedure
The detailed algorithm of the (modied) bisection choice procedure is as follows:
1. Given xi, we set a range for xi+1's indierence value. This range should be large
enough to include potential indierence values for xi, and it should be small enough
to allow for a good inference of the indierence point. We used the following equation
to determine this potential range:
x = maxf0;(xi + R)  0:5   rg (3)
 x = (xi + R)  1:5   r: (4)
The determination of this range re
ects the combined consideration of 
exibility and
eciency. Let xm =
x+ x
2 denote the middle point of the interval [x;  x]. Subjects
were rst presented a pair of lotteries: A = (xi;0:5;10) and B = (xi+1;0:5;0), with
xi+1 = xm. To ease calculations only integers were allowed. When xi is not a even
integer, the closest even integer larger than xi is taken.
2. If A is preferred, we know that xi+1 must be increased in order to achieve indierence.
We thus let xi+1 = xm+ x
2 . Likewise, if B is preferred, xi+1 must be decreased. We
then let xi+1 =
xm+x
2 .
3. Repeating this procedure 4 more times, the interval containing the indierence point
will become rather small. Finally, we choose the middle point of the nal interval to
be xi+1.
A drawback of the bisection procedure is that it is not entirely incentive compatible. If
subjects are aware of the entire experimental procedure from the start, they may have an
incentive to strategically misreport their choices. To see this, note that pretending to be
overly risk averse, i.e. choosing A all the time, raises xi+1 and thus increases the mean
payo of prospects B. Since subjects are paid their preferred prospect in one randomly
chosen pair, this misreporting strategy may increase their expected experimental payo.
To make it more dicult to fully grasp the bisection procedure, we added two choices at
14
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each point. The display of these two choices is independent from participant's choices and
is expected to make the inference of the whole algorithm more dicult.
The procedure may be best understood with a numerical example. In the experiment
we started the elicitation with the following pair of prospects: A = (20;0:5;10) s B =
(x1;0:5;0). The potential range of x1 is [15;45]. Participants will then face the following
sequence of choices.
No. Alternatives Choice Inference
1 A = (20;0:5;10) vs B = (30;0:5;0) A x1 2 [30;45]
2 A = (20;0:5;10) vs B = (24;0:5;0) A x1 2 [30;45]
3 A = (20;0:5;10) vs B = (38;0:5;0) A x1 2 [38;45]
4 A = (20;0:5;10) vs B = (34;0:5;0) A x1 2 [38;45]
5 A = (20;0:5;10) vs B = (41;0:5;0) B x1 2 [38;41]
6 A = (20;0:5;10) vs B = (39;0:5;0) A x1 2 [39;41]
7 A = (20;0:5;10) vs B = (40;0:5;0) A x1 2 [40;41]
8 A = (20;0:5;10) vs B = (41;0:5;0) B x1 2 [40;41]
Based these choices, x1 is set to equal to the middle point of the nal range [40;41], that
is, 40.5. If subjects choose A all the way, we simply set x1 equal to the upper bound of
the initial range, which is 45.10
Elicitation of probability weights was carried out in a similar manner. For each pi we
rst presented subjects with a xed sequence of ve pairs of prospects of structure A =
(x6;pi;x0) and B = (xi;pi;xi), where pi is successively set to :1;:9;:3;:7;:5. Having
nished these sequences for all xi;i = 1;:::;5, we proceeded with the bisection procedure.
If there was only one switching point for pi, two further iterations would be employed
to nd the point of indierence. If there were two or more switching points, an interval
encompassing all switching points would be determined and a maximum of 4 iterations of
10For the current example one may nd 8 choices are too much. For later rounds, this will be necessary
since xi increases with sequence and so does the potential range of xi.
15
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 053the bisection procedure was employed to nd out the indierence probability.
7 Appendix 2: Experimental Instructions
The experiment was carried out in June 2008 in the computerized laboratory of the Max
Planck Institute in Jena. We ran 4 sessions, with 32 subjects in 3 sessions and 28 subjects
in one session. Each Session lasted about 90 minutes. Participants could not observe each
other's choices. Rounds for payment were chosen individually and participants were paid
out privately and individually at the end of the experiment.
7.1 General Information
Thank you for participating in our experiment. Please end all conversations now and
switch o your cell phone. Please read the instruction carefully. The money you earn will
depend on the choice you make. The money will be paid to you in cash at the end of the
experiment. Throughout the experiment, we shall speak of ECU (experimental currency
units) rather than Euro. The exchange rate between ECU and Euro is xed to 20 ECU=
1 Euro. Please do not communicate during the experiment, and raise your hand if you
have questions. We will answer your questions individually. It is very important that you
obey these rules, since we would otherwise be forced to exclude you from the experiment
and hence from payment.
The Experiments consists of four parts. Each part consists of several rounds. In each
round you have to make a decision. At the end of the experiment one round of each part
is selected for payment. The sum of these four payments will be your nal payment.
7.2 Instructions for the UT experiment
The rst part of the experiment comprises 42 rounds. In each round, you will be presented
with a pair of risky alternatives. Your task is to pick your preferred alternative. To make
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screen. The pairs of risky alternatives will have the following format:
The alternatives shown above can be better understood by using the following thinking.
Imagine a big watch with one arm. In above gure, 40% of the panel is covered by white
and 60% of the panel is covered by black. The arm of the watch stops equally likely at
each position of the watch. Suppose now you have chosen alternative A from the above
pair. Then, if the arm stops in the white area, you are paid 300 ECU, if the arm stops at
the black area, you are paid 100 ECU. (Equivalent, had you chosen B you would be paid
200 in case of black and 50 in case of white)
At the end of this part of the experiment, one of your choices will be randomly selected
and played, and the resulting outcome will be your experimental earning in this part.
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This part is similar to the rst part. Again you will be asked for your preference between
two lotteries, the dierence being that lottery B always gives a xed payo. Another
dierence is that the probabilities in lottery A change for each decision. Using the picture
of the rst part: the division of the circle between black and white changes for each
decision. Please think carefully before each decision, since a conrmed choice cannot be
changed.
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